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AN AFRICAN LEGAL 
PHILOSOPHY OF 
DISABILITY JUSTICE
Between Discovery and Recognition
Dr. Oche Onazi
ISRF Early Career Fellow; Lecturer, Dundee Law School, University 
of Dundee
G
lobal disability justice discourse is shaped by two leading 
approaches. The human-rights-based approach is not only 
more dominant but treats disability justice as a question 
of equality and individual autonomy requiring the application 
of existing human-rights norms to persons with disability. The 
second approach is influenced by diverse perspectives on ‘ justice’ 
in the Western tradition of legal, political and social theory and 
philosophy, which variously respond to the neglect of disability 
in foundational writings. Because the literature proceeds from 
an abstract and universalist standpoint regarding disability and 
justice, it is unclear how it takes account of the particularities 
of non-Western political societies, or how – unlike the human-
rights-based approach – it influences concrete national laws, 
institutions, policies, practices and activism in non-Western 
societies. Amartya Sen’s1 and Marta Nussbaum’s2 capability/
capabilities approach is distinct regarding the philosophical 
underpinnings it provides to the concept of human development.3 
Nevertheless, the impact of Sen’s and Nussbaum’s approach on 
national laws and policies should not be exaggerated as a result 
1. Sen, A. (2001). Development as freedom. Oxford Paperbacks.
2. Nussbaum Martha, C. (2006). Frontiers of justice: disability, nationality, species 
membership.
3. Nussbaum, M. C. (2011). Creating capabilities. Harvard University Press.
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of the prevalence of the neoliberal concept of development and 
its indifference to disability justice.
Despite its progressiveness, Sen’s and Nussbaum’s approach, 
like the human-rights approach, suffers from a local legitimacy 
deficit because it is developed mainly from Western cultural 
experiences and understandings of disability and justice, and 
the literature in general lacks a comprehensive non-Western 
response to disability justice. Through African legal philosophical 
and theoretical thought, I seek to remedy this in my ISRF research.
My project demonstrates the character that disability justice 
would take if it mirrored an African legal philosophy constituted 
by the most attractive African ethical and moral values of 
community. While there is some consensus that the concept of 
community is common among African societies4,  there is no 
agreement on what the term ‘community’ means5,6, the claim here 
is of neither the pre-existence nor the existence but rather the 
universalisability of these ethical and moral values of community 
across Africa. Universalisability is predicated on the ability to 
appreciate these ethical and moral values as the thread that can 
bind Africans together despite their differences, and this is further 
contingent on cross-cultural exchanges and processes of shared 
learning made possible by laws and legal and political institutions. 
Although there are several ethical and moral values commonly 
associated with community in Africa, human interdependence is 
discursively selected as a plausible way of defining and valuing 
community and of extrapolating foundational and evaluative 
principles of disability justice. The African concept of community, 
a framework that facilitates togetherness or sharing an ethical 
life, is best exemplified by human interdependence, which can 
link vast differences across Africa into a common project. Neither 
individual nor community takes precedence over the complex, 
4. Metz, T. (2012). African conceptions of human dignity: Vitality and community as 
the ground of human rights. Human Rights Review, 13(1), 19-37.
5. Menkiti, I. A. (1979). Person and community in traditional African thought. African 
philosophy. New York: University Press of America.
6. Gyekye, K. (1997). Tradition and modernity: Philosophical reflections on the African 
experience. Oxford University Press.
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interlocking processes of interaction and continuum between 
humans and communities. Human interdependence bears witness 
not to the uniform but to the complex ethical ways of sharing 
lives. It encompasses the ethical and moral literacy that is acquired 
through learning from and sharing, exchanging, experiencing 
and interacting with each person. Human interdependence is 
predisposed to and provides the grounding for other values, 
particularly compassionate dispositions of love, care and affection 
for the most vulnerable people, not only as the ultimate measure 
of a community, but also of society as a whole.
A legal philosophy of disability justice founded on these precepts 
will provide a criterion for establishing and evaluating laws and 
legal and political institutions and practices according to the 
degree to which they include persons with disability within 
the range of interdependent relationships characteristic of 
a given community. This, of course, will include recognising 
and protecting the human rights of persons with disability as 
not only passive recipients of habits of love, care, affection, 
compassion and friendship (although this will depend on the 
type of disability) but capable of providing such themselves. 
This is important because the emphasis on individual autonomy, 
despite its significance in mainstream disability justice discourse, 
risks contributing to the isolation and deprivation of persons 
with disabilities and to the failure to recognise them as beings 
worthy and capable of typical community relationships. The 
proposed legal philosophy of disability justice first underscores 
the obligations of citizens without disabilities to citizens with 
them. The greatest strength of the African legal philosophy of 
disability justice may be its potential impact on the cultural and 
social attitudes of citizens without disabilities, as it nurtures 
a public moral culture that underscores not just a better 
understanding of the orthodox vertical citizenship obligations but 
also of the stringent horizontal ethical and moral obligations of 
citizens without disabilities to citizens with them. This new public 
moral culture of obligations would be contingent on a political, 
educational and legislative reform agenda capable of helping 
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citizens without disabilities to better appreciate their special 
obligations to citizens with disabilities, among other vulnerable 
citizens. It arises from the awareness that the mistreatment of 
citizens with disabilities is the result not only of a failure to accord 
them with standards of equal citizenship but also of the failure of 
citizens without disabilities to treat citizens with disabilities with 
love, empathy and compassion as a basic requirement of morality 
and justice that binds members of any political community. An 
essential part and practical component of this proposed reform 
agenda should be performed by moral citizenship education 
supported by a bill of responsibilities, both of which will provide 
a vehicle to concretise the ethical and moral obligations that are 
foundational to African legal philosophy.
My project invokes two unique but related questions of ‘discovery’ 
and ‘recognition’, although the latter is more apparent than the 
former. The question of what constitutes (or should constitute) 
a discovery can be preceded only by an ethical question of how 
to recognise ‘who’ or ‘what’ remains unrecognised, or for the 
purposes of my project, how to recognise ‘alterity’ or ‘otherness’. 
African ethical and moral values of community have traditionally 
not been articulated inclusively enough to recognise persons 
with disabilities, just as there is a failure to recognise African 
legal philosophy as a valid discipline capable of contributing to 
the understanding of laws and legal concepts and institutions 
that are relied upon to solve African and non-African problems. 
Certainly, the first and second question are related by the fact that 
the failure to recognise persons with disabilities is partly fuelled 
by concerns of the existence, identity and significance of African 
legal thought due to this denial to recognise it.
In both cases, recognition is analogous to an intersubjective 
reciprocal claim for the affirmation of identity, consciousness 
and respect between humans, rooted in a tradition of legal, social 
and political philosophy7,8 that dates back to Georg Wilhelm 
7. Honneth, A. (1996). The struggle for recognition: The moral grammar of social 
conflicts. Mit Press.
8. Taylor, C. (1995). Philosophical arguments. Harvard University Press.
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Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831). A comprehensive response to the 
first question is contingent on understanding the nature of, 
and possible solutions to, the second question. African legal 
philosophy is beleaguered with claims for recognition within 
legal philosophy. Another Hegelian legacy, namely the denial 
of the capacity for legal consciousness, which is a fundamental 
human essence9, is difficult for African legal philosophy to 
surmount and continues to deny it the ability to contribute to 
decisive debates about legal and social problems. On the one 
hand, Hegel proposed the concept of recognition10, but on the 
other, he grounded a destructive legacy of denial of African legal 
philosophy, a denial which has become a microcosm for the 
broader rejection of African knowledge and humanity.11 Not only 
does this point towards some of the issues at stake, it also reveals 
the unequal power relationships and processes of domination that 
produce, determine and shape the aspiration for and the outcome 
of recognition.
Implicit in both of the above claims for recognition is an 
essentialism about the defining character of being human or 
of law and legal philosophy, both of which demand a further 
response because they are additional hallmarks of Hegel, who 
subsumed both essentialist questions by equating human 
consciousness with the capacity for legal consciousness. Hegel’s 
overt bigotry detracts from a significant analytical point that may 
be deduced from it, namely that a comprehensive account of law 
cannot be successfully achieved without a background notion 
of human nature.12 This has been neglected in contemporary 
legal philosophy, but it explains why the legal field supplies 
the adjudicatory standards for determining a variety of claims 
for recognition.13 A preliminary response to both questions 
of recognition may first entail working within the disciplinary 
standards of ‘African’ legal philosophy and ‘legal philosophy’ in 
9. Murungi, J. (2013). An introduction to African legal philosophy. Lexington Books.
10. Hegel, G. W. F. (1976) Phenomenology of the Spirit. New York, Oxford University 
Press.
11. Hegel, G. W. F., & Sibree, J. trans.(2001) The Philosophy of History.
12. Murungi, J. (2013). op. cit.
13. Douzinas, C. (2000). End of human rights. Hart Publishing (UK).
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general, to demonstrate how claims for the recognition of persons 
with disabilities on the one hand, and African legal philosophical 
perspectives on the other, conform to the respective standards 
of these disciplines, or simply to show the novelty and originality 
of these claims in discovering previously unrecognised ways 
of thinking about and valuing humans and legal philosophy, 
respectively.
The problem remains that this leaves the terms (or who determines 
the terms and outcomes) of recognition unquestioned. Persons 
with disability, for example, will still be judged by socio-cultural 
standards of normalcy, whereas African legal philosophy will be 
judged by a universalism that eschews diversity and difference. 
An alternative or more disruptive response is therefore necessary 
to amplify the subjectivities, terms of recognition, disciplinary 
parameters and internal standards against which such claims 
should be judged. It is only on this condition that the precise 
novelty or disruptive nature of the various claims, and the benefits 
from human and disciplinary interdependence, can be fully 
recognised.
This will allow a process of critical introspection that is necessary 
to question the inclusive nature of African ethical and moral ideals 
of community, to discover not only alterity or otherness, but also 
how its founding precepts can be expanded beyond its original 
formulations to increase its capacity for recognition. This demand 
for recognition by persons with disability requires not just the 
application of African ethical and moral precepts to novel and 
contemporary problems, but also the revisiting and redefining of 
the structural, conceptual and foundational precepts in ways that 
disrupt existing categories of recognition. It is unclear whether 
African values of community and human ontology recognise 
persons with disability. Therefore, new concepts, conceptual 
structures and foundations – yielding new laws and legal and 
political institutions – are required.
